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Imagination by Design
Imagineered agency and the question of self-determination within 
digitally designed environments
Felix Fischer
Abstract
With the notion of the zero-level digital divide, questions of technological structure have 
become more pressing for matters of agency. In this, design plays a major role, as it is 
assumed to be of structural significance, predetermining the architecture of a given 
technology and, thereby, what one can actually do with it. When also considering the daily 
importance of digital technologies, the question arises, regarding how these designed 
technologies impact the way we come to realize reality and, ultimately, the self. How 
self-determinedly does one utilize digital technologies? As digital products, such as apps 
lack material elements, which could be adjusted to suit one’s personal needs, they are 
very much dependent on design being available to the senses. Building upon this insight, 
designers aim at creating user experiences. As experience is a highly personal process, 
design is dependent on the subject’s compliance to cognitively realize such experience. This 
paper will theoretically explore how design is individually constituted and how education 
can provide for possibilities to self-determinedly act within the designed environments 
of digital technologies. Starting with the notion of ‹imagineering›, it will be suggested to 
conceptualize design as a mental image in order to better understand how design can be 
cognitively adjusted once it is constituted.
Imagination by Design. Imagineered Agency und die Frage nach Selbstbestimmung 
in designten digitalen Umgebungen.
Zusammenfassung
Mit dem Zero-Level Digital Divide rücken strukturelle Fragen von digitalen Technologien in 
den Vordergrund von Teilhabe. Design von digitalen Technologien stellt hierbei einen sehr 
wichtigen Bereich dar, weil davon ausgegangen wird, dass sich das Design einer Tech-
nologie aufgrund seiner strukturalen Rolle in der jeweiligen technologischen Architektur 
signifikant auf die Nutzungsweisen auswirkt. Wird bedacht, dass digitale Technologien 
heute einen essentiellen Bestandteil des täglichen Lebens darstellen, so stellt sich hiermit 
auch die Frage, welchen Einfluss diese designten Technologien auf die Art wie wir Wirk-
lichkeit und damit auch unser Selbst wahrnehmen besitzen? Wie selbstbestimmt nutzen 
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wir eigentlich digitale Technologien? Weil digitale Produkte, wie z.B. Apps, keine physi-
schen Elemente besitzen, die an die individuellen Bedürfnisse anpassbar wären, bedür-
fen digitale Technologien eines durch die Sinne erfahrbaren Designs. Da Erfahrungen als 
individuelle Prozesse auf die Kognition des Subjektes angewiesen sind, bedarf auch die 
Konstitution von Design der ‹Compliance› des jeweiligen Nutzers. Der vorliegende Beitrag 
versucht zu klären, wie Design konstituiert wird und an welchen Punkten Bildung anset-
zen muss, um ein selbstbestimmtes Agieren in designten Welten sicherzustellen. Mit Ver-
weis auf die Idee von ‹Imagineering› wird vorgeschlagen, Design als mentales Image zu 
konzeptualisieren, um ein Verständnis davon zu erlangen, wie Design-Images verändert 
werden können, ohne dabei die materiellen oder sensorischen Elemente zu verändern. 
A designed issue
In the way digital technologies allow for the reception and production of informa-
tion, they carry inherent potentials for shaping one's perception of reality, and in the 
process, of self (cf. Wohn and Bowe 2016; Bürdek 2015, 9). In this, design plays an 
important role, as it predetermines how humans interact with and via digital tech-
nologies. Hence, it is striking that in German (media) pedagogy, scholars are only 
gradually querying the full impact of design on the human condition, especially in 
terms of securing agency within highly networked and designed environments (posi-
tive: cf. Jörissen and Verständig 2016; Jörissen 2018).
Unlike the prevailing everyday notion of design, commonly understood as the 
aesthetic arrangement of (surface) elements, in this contribution, design is concep-
tualized in a much broader sense by also considering its structural quality: In this, 
design has the potential for transforming personal behaviour and, in the process, 
culture (cf. Jörissen 2016). Let's take smart watches, for example: At a first glimpse, 
they seem to be somewhat regular digital watches. However, when looking at the 
way the software is designed – their technological architecture – these watches func-
tion as much more than that: They can be set to remind one to regularly exercise, 
when and how much to drink, when and how long to sleep, and they record specific 
behavioural parameters. In this, a watch's design has the potential for changing us-
ers behaviour and turning them into habits. An example for this would be providing 
for data about one's workout that allows for monitoring of individual progress and 
adjustment of workout sessions. In the bigger picture, such tendencies of monitoring 
personal behaviour and habits has the potential for transforming culture, as becomes 
perceptible with the example of the ‹quantified self› movement, which aims toward 
learning about the self through self-produced data (cf. Lupton 2017; Wolf 2009).
Habit forming and habit transforming design has become a major branch of 
product design, as it aids in securing customer loyalty by making the product an 
integral part of daily life (cf. Liu and Li 2016). Though, the question is: How many of 
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these habits are consciously noticed and, thus, welcomed? And how many remain 
unnoticed and, therefore, are a potential threat to self-determined action?
In order to tackle these queries, this piece argues that design must be seen in a 
much broader context than the mere surface design of smartphones or apps. In fact, 
the underlying processes, codes, and the overall employed logic, running a given sys-
tem, are as much of importance as the arrangement of sensory elements or the social 
interaction taking place within these designed environments (e.g., Baym 2015). This 
paper will plea for not allowing technological design to fall short in pedagogic re-
search. With the notion of the zero-level digital divide1 (cf. Iske, Klein and Verständig 
2016), it could be argued that knowledge of infrastructural design and its implica-
tions on interactions predetermines how self-determinedly a user interacts with a 
given technology or platform.
As will be shown throughout this article, to solely query the design of digital 
technology won't serve the matter any justice, as design can be no end in itself. It 
requires a subject with whom it can enter into a cognitive symbiosis, transforming 
design into what designers refer to as ‹big-D›: a designed experience (so-called ‹UX›). 
Therefore, this article calls upon investigations, which bring together two lines of 
inquiry: the design of technology and the individual grounds upon which this sym-
biosis is cognitively undertaken.
As most contributions are concerned with the empirically perceptible aspect of 
design, which is, in its essence, the arrangement of sensory elements, the article at 
hand will concentrate on the implications of design in its entire capacity at the ‹hu-
man end›. That being said, ‹human interfaces› or ‹user interfaces› (UI) and the way us-
ers interact with such is of especial interest as UI can be understood as the common 
‹gateway› for humans to a particular technology (cf. Hartevelt and van Vianen 1994). 
Deriving from this, the operating hypothesis is, that in order to maintain agency over 
one's interaction in digital environments, one must be aware of the UI design and the 
interwoven ‹design agenda›. As Jörissen (2016), with regard to Mareis (2011) argues, 
design is always imbued with particular forms of knowledge (e.g., usage scenarios), 
thus carrying epistemic potential that is realized in the moment of ‹affirmative us-
age› (cf. Jörissen 2016, 28; 2018). Under hyperconnected conditions2, design shifts 
away from a mere aesthetic arrangement of physical elements and toward a process 
of making the abstract world of codes, digital processes, and networks experientially 
accessible (cf. Bürdek 2015). 
1 The notion of the zero-level digital divide addresses issues of divide and thereof resulting inequalities due 
to the internet's architecture – so to speak, its ‹infrastructural-technological design› (cf. Verständig, Klein 
and Iske 2016, 52). For example, code of software may regulate usage behavior by providing for filtered 
information (e.g., by means of algorithms) or by allowing for certain actions (e.g., restrictions of function). 
In this, code is already predetermining what can be done by whom. As a result, the internet is not the same 
for everyone.
2 The notion of hyperconnection refers to the ascending «primacy of interactions, processes and networks 
as opposed to the current ‹stand-alone things, properties, and binary relations» (cf. Floridi 2015, 2).
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At a first step, this paper elaborates on the employed notion of design. It will be 
argued that design can be conceptualized as an experiential process. As a pragmatic 
framework, the concept of ‹mental imagery› will be introduced in order to place em-
phasis on the cognitive basis of design as an experience. Due to design's implicit 
forms of knowledge, it will finally be argued that for securing agency within designed 
communicative spaces, it is not so much of importance to physically redesign de-
signed environments, but to develop the ability to create and reshape the designed 
conditions, purposes, and norms, independent from design's material, medial, or 
technological form (cf. Jörissen 2017). This process will be referred to as ‹imagineer-
ing›. In this, education plays a major role. It introduces a higher cognitive counter-
weight to the otherwise evolutionary and automated mechanisms (e.g., habits), 
which design builds on in order to be mentally constituted.
A cognitive account on design
Digital products rely considerably on design: Unlike material objects, ‹digital things› 
are purely informational, making it necessary to provide for experiential access (cf. 
Jörissen 2016). As a result, design discourse has undergone a radical shift from tra-
ditional design, which is often referred to as ‹small-d›, addressing a rather inventive 
process out of which (material) products are developed, to so-called ‹big-D›. ‹Big-
design› aims at creating user experiences, which interpret and visualize the abstract 
world of codes and algorithms in order to make them available to the senses (cf. 
Bürdek 2015, 243). As interpretation processes are always directed from a certain 
world view (based on a ‹model of reality›) with certain knowledge and under the im-
pression of specific ideologies – with an agenda in the broadest sense – design and 
designed experiences are always imbued with a variety of knowledge forms.
When conceptualizing experience as an autonomous and individual process – af-
ter all, experience is a private matter that varies between individuals and can consist 
of the flow of perception, bodily sensations, emotions, and much more (cf. Pope and 
Singer 1978, 1) – designing an experience is reliant on the subject's willingness to 
comply with the implied usage scenarios, models of reality, and ideologies, which 
are part of the design. Hence, designers must, first and foremost, establish a basic 
relationship between the available sensory elements of a product and the subject in 
order to provide for a basis upon which the intended experience can be generated 
(e.g., Hogue 2005). Pragmatically speaking, this must be accomplished by address-
ing basic cognitive processes in which ‹evolutionary mechanisms› are triggered and 
automatically executed, so that no conscious decision, as to if and how one should 
interact with a product, is necessary. As a consequence of such theoretical framing, 
the sole investigation of the perceptible arrangement of sensuously available ele-
ments won't do the matter any justice. Instead, one ought to also consider the cogni-
tive mechanisms involved in generating and maintaining a designed experience.
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At a first step, it appears valuable to commence with the question of what de-
signers mean by the notion of ‹designing a user experience› and how they pragmati-
cally work on the issue. From here, light is shed onto the neurocognitive processes 
involved (cf. chapters 3 and 4).
Garrett (2006) provides for a pragmatic account, in regard to creating a designed 
experience. To him, designing an experience means addressing the subject's experi-
ential abilities from a multitude of sensuous, cognitive, and conceptual planes. He 
differentiates these into:
1. Sensory design (manifest level/ surface)
2. Information design (skeleton level/ arrangement of design elements)
3. Interaction design and information architecture (structural level)
4. Functional specifications and content requirements (scope level)
5. User needs and product objectives (strategy level)
On the sensory plane, or ‹surface› (e.g., UI), sensory elements stimulate the senses, 
which are regularly of – but not limited to – visual, auditory, or tactile quality. In 
order to be of any interest, the surface must attract the subject's attention and elicit 
motivation for further engagement with the designed object. This is usually realized 
by means of aesthetic form. Neurological studies indicate that aesthetic apprecia-
tion is a two-step process: First, the individual performs a general evaluation of the 
aesthetic value of an object (‹beautiful› vs. ‹not beautiful›) – often via visual percep-
tion. This usually occurs within the first 300-400ms of perceiving the stimulus. In a 
consecutive step (400-1000ms), the object is further aesthetically judged by compar-
ing it to other known (non-)aesthetic stimuli (cf. Righi et al. 2017). In his theory of the 
neurobiological foundations of aesthetics and art, Rolls (2017) points to the great 
importance of emotions in the process of aesthetic judgement. According to evolu-
tionary theory, emotions decode a stimulus as either being rewarding or punishing, 
thus, generating a goal for further actions (e.g., further engagement with the object).
The fashion in which the sensory elements are arranged, and thus, which emo-
tional reaction they provoke, is predetermined by the information design (‹skeleton 
plane›). The information design resembles concrete expressions of the underpin-
ning structural level (the underlying ‹blue print›) and, hence, articulates the intended 
‹flow of experience› (cf. 36).
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Three important planes of UI design for ‹engineering› an experience (cf. Garrett 2006; 
Kofler 2019, 385, 731, 1087; graphic F.F.).
Figure 1 visualizes the different forms of ‹micro designs› involved in UI design: When 
imagining all three planes stacked behind each other, the surface plane would be in 
front of the skeleton plane, which would be in front of the structural plane. Both the 
surface and the skeleton planes, are important for actually initializing an experience, 
whereas on the structural plane, the interaction design and information architecture 
allow for engineering of the intended experience on a theoretical level. However, it 
is the surface that evokes interaction with a given design, as it provides for sensuous 
stimuli that raise one's interest and, perhaps, cue habitual responses.
At a very basic level, the ultimate goal of design is to trigger, transform, or even 
create habits (cf. Liu and Li 2016). Habitual responses (also known as stimulus-driven 
control behaviour) are executed upon a perceived stimulus, no matter the action's 
consequences (cf. O'Doherty, Cockburn and Pauli 2017, 74f.). Such model-free be-
havioural routines are hard-wired into the brain, making it possible to automatically 
execute them without taking up valuable cognitive capacities (cf. ibid., 88). In this 
quality, habits are often difficult for the individual to control or even notice. From 
a design point of view, habits are valuable, as they secure interaction with a given 
product without the subject consciously reflecting on its usage.
As for the design of UI, the elicitation of habitual responses or the (trans-) for-
mation of such is of great significance, not only because habits allow for automated 
(‹intuitive›) usage of UI, but also because habits can be shared in social groups. By 
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addressing these social or communal habits (e.g., reception preferences), a design 
can be embedded within given cultural norms (e.g., Pietrass and Ulrich 2009). This 
makes the acceptance of a product more probable.
Thus, for design to be intuitively accessible, designers must not only provide 
for aesthetic stimuli, which raise interest and guide perception, but they also ought 
to anticipate users' habits, embedded into specific nonmaterial cultures3. By doing 
so, different usage scenarios can be implied through the arrangement of sensory 
elements, essentially drawing upon individual, as well as commonly shared habits 
(‹conventions›).
When considering habit eliciting design, a simple process of cues, routines, and 
rewards are at the onset of the creation of a user experience. Whereas cues (e.g., 
triggered by sensory stimuli) provide for a necessity to act (e.g., message buzz as an 
external trigger), the reward (e.g., positive emotional response) for the successful 
execution of a behavioral routine (e.g., interaction with others) can be considered 
as an emotional ‹building-block› for creating a further motivational foundation for 
an ‹experience›. However, design may also contradict established habits, therefore, 
‹cognitively› challenging the individual to transform existing habits.
Marketing research has identified a variety of different experiential domains, 
which are of potential interest to commercial product designers:
1. sensory domain (e.g., products with aesthetic and sensory appeal),
2. affective domain (e.g., products that trigger emotions),
3. cognitive domain (e.g., products that engage with customers on a creative prob-
lem-solving level),
4. physical domain (e.g., products that encourage to act and foster habits), and
5. social domain (e.g., products that target the desire for a specific way of life or to 
relate to a group identity) (cf. Schmitt 2015).
The commercial interest in designing ‹rewarding› user experiences, which address 
a variety of sensuous, cognitive, as well as social modalities lays in the simple hope 
that consumers can be manipulated in their behaviour and, ultimately, create habits 
in favor of the product (cf. Levy 1959; Sametz 2006, 26) or in favour of an underpin-
ning idea, such as sustainability, to name one example.
Habitual adjustments, elicited by design, can be understood as a very basic ‹ed-
ucational process›, best resembled by the notion of upbringing (cf. Jörissen 2016, 
2018a): In this way, design educates individuals in that it conditions them on what to 
do and what not to do. The notion of design as some kind of an ‹educating force› is 
not new, as it can be found in prior architectural debates, such as that of ‹Bauhaus› 
3 Although the concept of culture is quite complex, it is traditionally differentiated into (1) material culture, 
which encompasses architecture, paintings, fashion, theatre and alike, as well as (2) nonmaterial culture, 
including values, belief systems, rituals, worldviews, and so forth (cf. Ahmad 2008, 23).
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(Bürdek 2015, S. 27). Through emerging digitalization, however, the matter has risen 
to heightened importance (cf. Jörissen 2018), as by means of algorithms and artifi-
cial intelligence, designs of UI are provided with a prodigious potential for greater 
adaptability and, of course, for greater possibilities to influence users' habits. These 
technological developments shouldn't lead to the promise of a ‹technical fix› in edu-
cation, however. Instead, they rather require education for self-determined action.
When speaking of ‹educating›, it seems inevitable to consider design in its pro-
cessual capacity (cf. Ehn 2013). Thus, taking the designer's claim of creating user 
experiences seriously, it appears reasonable to assume design as being of chief cog-
nitive quality.
The imagineering of design
The notion of design as experience encompasses a triangulation of both the design in 
its perceptible manifestation (e.g., aesthetically arranged elements, pixels, etc.) and 
the ‹human end›, meaning the person generating and maintaining the actual experi-
ence. In this, design is constituted in a complex relationship between the perceptible 
form of a product and the individual's compliance to experientially, as well as cogni-
tively realize the designer's anticipated forms of knowledge. Thus, Bürdek (2015) re-
fers to this complex process of designing as one of ‹imagineering›4 (cf. p. 152, 243ff.).
The word-play may seem a bit peculiar at first. However, at a second glance, it 
captures quite vividly the transformation of increasing complexity, which (digital) de-
sign is confronted with: The term ‹imagineering› refers to this new task, which should 
«allow others to see and experience the [often diffuse] ideas involved» (ibid.; ad. F.F.) 
in digital products. As a process, it addresses both the rational side, as well as the 
emotional side of users by providing for a meaningful experience that triggers the im-
agination as a powerful processing tool (cf. Kuiper and Smit 2014, 9). In the context of 
digital design, this is important, as design is confronted with the highly complex task 
of marrying the abstract world of codes and networks with the experiential reality of 
humans. As Nijs (2019) points out, ‹imagineering› as an «experience-driven design 
approach» (p. 22), is ideal for such complex tasks, as it accounts for the lack of simple 
deterministic cause-and-effect relationships in complex matters and allows for new 
ways of design and reasoning by capitalizing on experience-based abilities, such as 
creativity (cf. ibid., 23). In this, ‹imagineering› is no sole tool for product designers, 
but it is a form of experience-driven reasoning in the broadest sense.
When disassembling the term ‹imagineering› into its two word-components, ‹im-
age› and ‹engineering›, the following implications arise in terms of design:
4 The term ‹imagineering› was brought to public awareness and later was registered as a trademark by US 
movie maker Walt Disney. Currently the term is used in design discourse to describe «a new style of design 
thinking» (Lichtenstein 2019, XII).
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1. The term ‹image› refers to design as a cognitive structure (format), which must be 
imagined (cognitively realized) by the subject.
2. This act of imagination, however, is not left to the subject's choice or to chance, 
but has to be carefully ‹engineered›, meaning that the subject must be motivated 
to imagine the forms of knowledge and usage scenarios anticipated by the de-
signer and expressed in the arrangement of forms, elements, and pixels.
In the following, the ‹format› of experiential design is explored. It will be argued that 
the cognitive structure of mental imagery could be a valuable commencing point, as 
suggested by the term ‹imagineering› itself. So, the question is: What is a mental im-
age? And how is it connected to design?
A brief review on empirical work concerning mental imagery
Psychological investigations often define mental imagery as a multisensory (cf. 
Spence and Deroy 2013; Lacey and Lawson 2013; Kosslyn, Thompson and Ganis 2006, 
4) «experience like perception but in the absence of a percept» (Holmes et al. 2016, 
250). More specifically, mental imagery can be thought of as a cognitive process (cf. 
Kaufmann 1996, 101; Zvyagintsev et al. 2013), which primarily accesses perceptual 
information from memory (cf. Cartwright et al. 2019). Although mental imagery can 
be generated, as well as sustained in the absence of exteroceptive stimuli (cf. MacNa-
mara 2017; Lewis et al. 2013, 391) by retrieving information from long-term memory, 
there is another route via which images can be generated: Sometimes short-term 
memory is utilized, drawing directly from immediate perceptual information (cf. 
Pearson et al. 2013, 6). Unlike ‹afterimages›, which are the result of photochemical 
processes in the retina, mental imagery can be relatively prolonged and it can also 
contain novel perceptual information by means of modified perceptual information 
or new combinations of perceptual information (cf. Cartwright et al. 2019, 2). Fur-
thermore, mental imagery can be consciously generated by the subject in an act of 
imagination or unconsciously, as a result of an external stimulus (cf. Lewis et al. 2013, 
391).
Traditionally, psychologists differentiate mental imagery into two means of rep-
resentation: 
1. Depictive representation (cf. Kosslyn, Ball and Reiser 1978), as well as
2. propositional/ descriptive representation (cf. Kosslyn, Thompson and Ganis 2006, 
10; Reisberg 1996, 165ff.). 
Both types of representation are coded in different formats: The depictive format 
addresses the experiential quality of mental imagery, that is to say the sensory 
modality, having been well-researched with visual mental imagery. At this level, 
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representations are explicit and accessible in every aspect of shape, size, orienta-
tion in space, texture, color, (special) relations of different points or elements, and 
so forth (cf. Kosslyn, Thompson and Ganis 2006, 14). Some individuals have been 
found to represent ambiguous objects accordingly as ambiguous mental imagery (cf. 
Mast and Kosslyn 2002). As Pearson et al. (2015) point out, this must be achieved at 
the depictive level (cf. p. 596), as at the descriptive level (verbal thinking), ambiguity 
is not possible, due to the propositional format (cf. Reisberg 1996). In contrast, de-
scriptive representations (propositional format) encompass symbolic, that is to say, 
abstract concepts (cf. Kaufmann 1996, 103). In propositional format, representations 
are explicit and accessible on a level of semantic relations (cf. Kosslyn, Thompson 
and Ganis 2006, 14), providing for specific descriptions about shape, size, pitch, and 
so forth. Consequently, descriptive representations only specify what was included 
at the moment of the creation of depictive representation (cf. ibid.). For matters of 
design and designed experience, the depictive level, and especially its phenomeno-
logical characteristics (that is the way they are consciously experienced by the sub-
ject) will be of especial interest in understanding how design is not only mentally 
constructed, but how it is also experienced. Thus, the rest of this article will deal with 
the depictive representational format.
As Behrmann (2000) points out, mental imagery plays a key role in day-to-day 
tasks, such as processes of learning, reasoning, problem solving, as well as language 
comprehension (cf. p. 50). In addition, mental imagery has been found to be impor-
tant in memory, creativity, and emotion (cf. Kosslyn, Thompson and Ganis 2006, 4).
The phenomenological characteristics of mental imagery are commonly de-
scribed and measured by the vividness of a mental image (cf. Pearson et al. 2013, 
7; Marks 1999). Vividness is defined as «a combination of clarity and liveliness. The 
more vivid an image, therefore, the closer it approximates an actual percept» (Marks 
1999, 570 cit. a. Marks 1972, 83). An important aspect of vividness are emotions that 
share a profound link with mental imagery (cf. Wilson et al. 2018). Experiencing 
emotionally vivid mental imagery typically triggers much of the same physiological 
reactions as actual perception of stimuli with a comparable emotional valence (cf. 
Cartwright et al. 2019, 2), thus, underlining the intense experiential character of im-
ages. Additionally, clinical studies suggest that people with a strong ability to self-
directedly generate and experience mental imagery, especially of the visual kind, are 
more emotionally regulated, as they are able to mentally pre-experience and, thus, 
simulate the likely outcome of a given event (cf. Maxwell et al. 2017, 274; Holmes et 
al. 2016; Marks 1999). In this, mental imagery plays an important role in emotional 
regulation, motivation, goal planning, as well as readiness for action (cf. Laing, Mor-
land and Fornells-Ambrojo 2016; Marks 1999).
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Where the magic happens: How design becomes a designed experience
So, how does design become a designed experience? To answer this question, the 
concept of mental imagery provides for a theoretical perspective and allows for bet-
ter comprehension of the cognitive format of a designed experience. Whereas more 
basic mechanisms, such as aesthetically guided perception or habitual responses, 
have been discussed as establishing a mental connection between product and sub-
ject, mental imagery allows for insight on how design is actually experienced and 
maintained as a cognitive process. As indicated, mental imagery is not ‹just› one form 
of cognitive representation of the sensory elements of a given design, it is the format 
in which humans reason, creatively solve problems, or plan future actions. By means 
of emotions, for instance, mental imagery can be vividly experienced and, thereby, 
approximates actual perception. Through this, mental imagery becomes an experi-
ence in the conventional sense.
In relation to a design image, the mental image itself cannot be an objective rep-
resentation of the arrangement of sensory elements per se, but is already the struc-
tured outcome of the way in which the sensory elements have guided perception. 
The design image is, so to speak, the suggested interpretation, via the arrangement 
of the sensory elements that represents the intended ‹flow of experience›, arranged 
by the designer. Thus, the generated mental image is potentially ambiguous in mean-
ing, as this interpretation is – despite its suggestive nature – one of many that can be 
derived from the arrangement of sensory elements.
Consequently, ‹engineering› an image, as suggested by the term ‹imagineer-
ing›, means to experientially guide the individual to cognitively realize the antici-
pated forms of knowledge, accepting and realizing the underpinning model of reality 
(‹world view›), as well as the implied ideologies, which in turn logically structure the 
according design and provide for its very identity. This may be achieved by creating 
‹aesthetic incentives› (e.g., aesthetic arrangement of sensory elements) in order to 
evoke the subject's interest in the object (e.g., Rolls 2014; 2017), as well as to guide 
the perception process of the elements (e.g., Arnheim 1980). Other factors may in-
clude habitual stimuli, which allow for automated usage of design and provide for 
rewarding experiences.
Based on the perceptual outcome, which is stored in short-term memory, a men-
tal image is constructed. As indicated by an ERP-study5, positive emotions may in-
fluence the bottom-up modelling process of the according representation (Righi et 
al. 2017). This insight may be important in understanding the subjective nature of 
image construction and the delicate tasks designers are confronted with, when try-
ing to elicit a certain design image by providing for the proper perceptual, as well as 
emotional stimuli.
5 ERP stands for ‹event-related potential›. ERP-studies typically measure brain responses to immediate sen-
sory, cognitive, or motor events.
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As evolutionary-based cognitive theories on aesthetic reception argue, most 
mental processes are part of evolutionary-developed mechanisms and automated 
routines (cf. Rolls 2014; 2017; Dutton 2005), which mostly occur beyond conscious 
control. Consequentially, if sensory elements are arranged in the proper manner, 
they function as strong stimuli, leading to design image creation by the individual. 
This includes the implicit realization of different forms of knowledge, world views, 
and so forth. With respect to the opening question of this article, concerning how 
self-determined action can be possible in designed environments, the answer must 
be: self-determination seems less probable at the point of image constitution. 
Though, as theories on mental imagery show, this is not the end of the story. On the 
contrary, theories about mental imagery teach us that such are not photo-like enti-
ties that cannot be changed. In fact, the adaptability of images can be considered as 
one of the most important characteristics of mental imagery, which humans utilize 
for creative thinking, problem solving, and so forth.
Thus, for pedagogy, understanding the construction process of mental imagery is 
one part, but what seems to be even more important is the question regarding what 
one can do with a designed image, once it has been constituted. To put it in different 
terms: It seems less important to physically alter a given designed environment or 
object – which is oftentimes not easy to achieve – but rather to develop the ability 
to create and reshape the designed conditions, purposes, and norms independent 
from the design's material, medial, or technological form (cf. Jörissen 2017). When 
recalling the different characteristics of mental imagery, it was reported that mental 
imagery is an ideal format for the individual to simulate future scenarios, in order to 
prepare for future actions. This is done by transforming and manipulating existing 
images. Image manipulation has been found helpful in problem solving, by means 
of taking on different perspectives. This involves the restructuring of an image, and 
thereby reconstructing an alternative meaning (cf. Maxwell, Lynn and Lilienfeld 2017, 
271; Pearson et al. 2013, 5-8).
In educational terms, the process of image transformation and manipulation can 
be seen as the essential representational form for critical reasoning, in which the 
established design image can be reevaluated and reinterpreted without actually al-
tering the physical structure of sensory elements. It may be argued that the cogni-
tive redesign of a design image could be the first step toward (inter-) acting with a 
product on an informed basis: not on the designer's, but on the individual's terms. 
All the individual requires, as mental imagery teaches us, is one's ability to imagine.
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Closing remarks: Education and imagination in designed environments
The aim of this article was to show that research on design and designed structures 
of digital technologies is not an end in itself, but is the necessary foundation upon 
which interaction on social platforms, with digital technologies in general, or in de-
signed environments must be interpreted. It was further argued that, in educational 
research, it is worth it to not only focus on the actual physical arrangement of sen-
sory elements, but also on the cognitive act of constructing and transforming design 
as a mental image.
The proposed focus on mental imagery allows for a more individual-centered 
perspective, as it motivates to query and understand design as an individually con-
structed mental image. Commencing from this theoretical frame, a variety of new 
questions arise for educational scientists, such as: How is design established as 
an experience within one's mind? And, how can one use mental imagery to secure 
one's autonomy while operating designed technologies? For media pedagogy, this 
perspective comes with far-reaching implications, as it demands focus on the cogni-
tive dimension, that is the manipulation and transformation of mental imagery – or 
better: ‹imagineering›. This is not to say that physical engagement with the mate-
rial dimension of media or scientific investigations toward media's material form are 
obsolete. On the contrary: Cognition, and more specifically experience, is profoundly 
linked with our physical world, as it provides – psychologically speaking – for the 
stimuli that regularly elicit cognitive processes. But it is suggested that in digital en-
vironments, the cognitive ability to work with design images both critically and re-
flectively is of especial importance, particularly in light of experiential design, as it 
allows for critical investigation toward ‹design's agenda›.
The perspective of ‹imagineering›, hence, forces one to query: How is a design 
image engineered? How and at which stage does design impact the choices individu-
als make? When glimpsing at the habitual, as well as evolutionary-directed mecha-
nisms that guide interest and perception and thereby the construction of the design 
image, one could, indeed, come to understand that the cognitive construction of im-
plicitly interwoven design is inevitably a design-directed process. However, the con-
cept of mental imagery shows that this is not the end of the story. It is more so that 
one must acknowledge that the transformation and manipulation of such designed 
images is possible, although such must be learned, and that autonomy can be strived 
for by experimenting with these designed images. Here, education comes into play, 
as it can prepare the individual to critically reflect upon these images and to make 
transformational changes, independent from the conditions, purposes, and norms 
set by design's material, medial, or technological form (cf. Jörissen 2017).
As Jörissen and Verständig (2016) note, the consideration of code and design as 
constitutional aspects of education in the digital world of ours comes with many new 
implications, questions, and unknown constellations, not only for the tech-industry, 
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but much more-so for educational science. In this, new competencies must be taught 
to account for these transformational changes. One of such competencies, thus this 
article's main argument, is imagineering. As shown throughout this article, imagi-
neering is no one-sided tool, which designers only employ to provide for their de-
signed experience. It is rather a process that carries inherent epistemic potential, in 
that it allows for the individual to redesign a design image: a competence that ap-
pears of chief quality in increasingly designed digital environments.
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